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Since the classic paper by Friedman and Savage (1948), it has gener-
ally been accepted that the observed fact that individuals or firmsl 
participate in unfair lotteries and other forms of unfair risk taking2 
may be explained by a section in the individual's utility function in 
which the individual shows risk preference rather than risk aversion. 
In their model, Friedman and Savage specify a utility function which 
is, in turn, concave, convex, and concave, thus allowing for simultane-
ous purchase of insurance (risk aversion) and participation in lotteries 
(risk preference). 
However, while their specified utility function is indeed capable of 
explaining observed behavior, it does seem to be rather unsatisfactory 
in that it is an ad hoc specification. It is the purpose of this paper to 
suggest a set of circumstances which give rise to a Friedman-
Savage-type utility function. 
In particular, it is shown that when certain capital market imper-
fections exist the utility function defined over intermediate wealth 
should be distinguished from and may have different properties than 
the one defined on final wealth. Then, even if we accept the common 
assumption made in the literature that individuals are risk averse, that 
is, that their utility function is concave over final wealth, it is still 
possible that they participate in unfair gambling (and, of course, may 
also purchase insurance). 
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the European Meeting of the 
Econometric Society, Athens, September 1979. We wish to thank the editor and an 
anonymous referee for their helpful comments. 
1 The word "individual" is, throughout this paper, used to denote economic units, 
including both individuals and firms. 
• The term "unfair lottery" in the paper encompasses all investment opportunities 
offering actuarially unfair risks. 
lfournal oj Pol,lJcai Economy, 1981, yol. 89, no. 41 
© 1981 by The UnoveroilY of Chicago. 0022-380818118904-0010$01.50 
81 9 
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
The motivation behind our endeavor to provide an institutional 
explanation for gambling is a reluctance (shown, e.g., by Stigler and 
Becker [1977]) to use non-well-behaved utility functions as expla-
nations for economic phenomena without some a priori reasons for 
assuming that the utility function is of an unusual shape. Clearly all 
phenomena in economics can be technically explained by recourse to 
tastes. Thus, for example, individuals will necessarily show risk pref-
erence over a section of their utility function which is assumed con-
vex. However, is there any a priori reason to assume that there may be 
such a section? It is a positive answer to this question which this paper 
attempts to provide. 
In Section II we discuss certain capital market imperfections and 
their implications about the nature of rates of return on investment. 
In Section III we show how the Friedman-Savage utility function may 
emerge when utility is defined on intermediate wealth and there exist 
capital market imperfections. The possibility of gambling with risk 
aversion and of simultaneous gambling and insurance therefore im-
mediately arises. 
II. Rates of Return and Capital Market Imperfections 
A number of recent studies discuss the effects of uncertainty, im-
perfect information, and various transaction costs on capital markets 
and show that the result may be that capital markets are characterized 
by certain imperfections. These imperfections are usually in terms of 
the nonexistence of certain markets and the fact that there may not be 
free and equal access to other markets. Uncertainty and the possibility 
of costly default may lead lenders to introduce collateral requirements 
or take default costs into account in their loan rates. Consequently, it 
can be said that one has to have certain assets (providing collateral 
services) in order to have easier or cheaper access to capital markets. 
Barro (1976) and Benjamin (1978) derive these conclusions ex-
plicitly and show that market imperfections will lead to loan rates 
being functions of loan sizes and available collateral. In particular, 
they derive a loan-supply function which is constant for some initial 
range and then becomes an increasing and convex function of loan 
sizes. 
In the same vein, Jaffee and Modigliani (1969) show that, as a result 
of uncertainty and imperfect and costly information, capital markets 
may be characterized by credit rationing. They show that beyond a 
certain point loan rates will generally depend on loan sizes, with a 
possible upper bound on loan sizes. Furthermore, they provide 
empirical evidence supporting these types of imperfections. 
Empirical evidence indicating capital market imperfections is also 
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given by Eckstein (1961) and Nerlove (1968), who find capital markets 
to be characterized by differential rates of return on given invest-
ments. 
The important implication of the capital market imperfections is 
that individuals face a variety of capital market constraints and, there-
fore, do not have free and equal access to the market. Consequently, 
capital provides additional services by either weakening the accessi-
bility constraints or by reducing the cost of the acquisition of capital. 
By providing collateral services, capital, therefore, increases the set of 
"feasible activities" or reduces their cost, so that its "full rate of 
return" should take this additional role into account. 
A consequence of these capital market imperfections is that for 
some levels of asset holdings the rates of return on assets may depend 
on the levels of the asset holdings, even from an individual's (rather 
than an aggregate) point of view. The range within which this is likely 
to happen is when wealth levels are low, but not below some minimum 
level. When an individual's wealth is below some minimum level the 
capital market constraints may be so effective that except for the 
possibility of obtaining small loans the market is in effect inaccessible. 
Since small loans can usually be obtained at constant loan rates (as is 
shown in Jaffee and Modigliani [1969], Barro [1976], and Benjamin 
[1978), the additional role of asset holding is ineffective within this 
initial range, and consequently the rates of return will not depend on 
asset holdings. However, as an individual's asset holdings increase 
above some minimum level, his higher level of wealth will provide him 
with the additional "collateral services," and rates of return within this 
range will depend on the levels of wealth. 
Since rates of return are usually not known with certainty, the 
dependence of rates of return on asset holdings is in a probabilistic 
sense. In other words, the rates-of-return probability distribution 
function changes with asset holdings, that is, the distribution is condi-
tional on asset holdings. 3 
In addition to the above considerations, rates of return may be 
increasing functions of wealth (over some initial range) for other 
reasons as well. First, a large number of fixed costs may be incurred in 
effecting profitable investment. Information costs incurred in locat-
ing high-return investments may be considerable, and a large element 
of these costs may be relatively fixed. Transaction costs, where again 
the large part is fixed, are also likely to comprise a high percentage of 
small investments. In the presence of these costs the rate of return will 
be an increasing function of the investment. Second, there may exist 
3 Thus, e.g., an increase in asset holdings will over some range make the probability 
distribution more stochastically dominant. 
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significant indivisibilities which (especially in view of the capital mar-
ket constraints) will imply increasing returns to scale. 
In view of these considerations, we conclude that individuals, espe-
cially those with small or moderate levels of wealth, may very often 
face various capital market constraints which lead to rates of return 
being functions of wealth. Furthermore, the relationship between 
wealth and the rates of return is such that rates of return are (at least 
over some range) increasing functions of wealth. 
III. Gambling with Risk A version 
Having discussed some of the capital market imperfections and the 
constraints they impose on individuals, we now consider their effects 
on the individual's attitudes toward risk taking. 
In order to focus on the gambling problem and to separate it from 
the investment problem, we assume that the rate of return is nonran-
dom. This assumption is not crucial and does not change the results. 
For the sake of simplicity, we also assume that there is only one asset. 
A discussion of the case with many assets and random rates of return 
can be found in Appelbaum and Katz (1979), where the same results 
are derived. 
In line with the discussion in the previous section, it will be assumed 
that the individual faces a rate of return R on his investment, A, such 
that 
R' o O:S:; A :s:; A* 
R = R(A) R' > 0 for A * :s:; A :s:; A ** (1) 
R' o for A > A**, 
where R' is the partial derivative of R. In other words, the rate of 
return is constant over some initial range, increasing over some sub-
sequent range,4 and then constant again. 
An individual investing an amount A will end up with final wealth 
W, such that 
W = A[l + R(A)]. (2) 
Clearly, convexity of R(A) over some range is sufficient, but not 
necessary, for the convexity ofW(A) over the same range; both convex 
and concave rate-of-return functions may lead to a convex W(A).s 
• This type ofreturn function is diScussed also in Blinder (1974) and Appelbaum and 
Harris (1978). 
• It does, however, seem reasonable that at least over some initial range (when R is not 
constant) R" > 0, i.e., the function is convex. The convexity of R(A) at the initial range 
would, e.g., follow from the convexity of the loan-supply function derived by Jaffee and 
Modigliani (1969), Barro (1976), and Be~amin (1978). 
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Let us now consider the individual's decision problem. Following 
the literature ,6 we assume the individual has a utility function defined 
on final wealth, U(W), and that 
U' > 0, U" < 0; (3) 
that is, the individual is risk averse. 
Now, consider the individual's utility function when it is defined 
over A -his intermediate wealth. This is given by 
V(A) = U{A[l + R(A)]} (4) 
and 
V'(A) = U' . (1 + R + AR'), (5) 
V"(A) = U" . (1 + R + AR'? + u' . (W' + AR"). (6) 
Therefore, in accordance with our above discussion, V' > 0 for all 
values of A. For A < A* and A > A**, V" is clearly negative. Within the 
range A * < A :s A ** the second term on the right-hand side of (6) may 
be positive and, hence, V" may be positive. If this occurs there will be a 
section of V(A) that will be convex and, hence, V will show the 
Friedman-Savage shape of being in turn concave, convex, and con-
cave. 
The result may also be derived diagrammatically, as is shown in 
figure 1. The curve V(A) drawn in the first quadrant is clearly a 
Friedman-Savage type of utility function which allows both gambling 
and insurance in intermediate wealth to take place simultaneously. 
Even if V(A) is concave within the range A * < A < A **, we can still 
get a convex region, as in the Friedman-Savage utility function, since 
V(A) will, in general, have a kink at A*. Thus, although in this case 
V(A) is made of concave segments only, it will nevertheless not be 
globally concave. This case is shown in figure 2, where again it is 
possible to observe gambling and insurance simultaneously. 
Hence, we have provided an explanation of the shape of the 
Friedman-Savage utility function without suggesting that an indi-
vidual is anything but everywhere risk averse. Rather than focus on 
the tastes of the individual, we have focused on his institutional 
constraints. 7 
8 See, e.g., Anow 1970. 
7 An alternative way of obtaining these results is to employ the state preference 
approach and consider the effects of capital market imperfections on the set of accept-
able gambles. It can be easily shown (see Appelbaum and Katz 1979) that the isoutility 
curves defined over two random states are not necessarily convex, and thus both 
gambling and insurance buying may occur simultaneously. 












This paper provides a possible rationale for the Friedman-Savage 
utility function. It suggests that the existence of market imperfections, 
in particular in the capital markets, may impose various constraints on 
individuals and thus affect their behavior. The existence of these 
constraints could lead individuals to participate in unfair gambling, 
since this may reduce the implicit costs of the constraints. 
COMMENTS 
Our explanation of gambling focuses on the constraints facing an 
individual rather than on his preferences, and consequently it does 
not require a modification of the standard assumption that individu-
als are risk averse. Of course, it may be that individuals show risk 
preference over a section of their utility function. Such a section is 
not, however, necessary in order to derive a Friedman-Savage type of 
utility function. 
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